























In his book Civic Virtue and the So-
vereignty of Evil: Political Ethics in Un-
certain Times, Derek Edyvane continues 
the long tradition of finding a common 
ground for political action not in what 
we aspire to achieve – summum bonum – 
but in what we collectively want to pre-
vent from happening – summum ma-
lum. However, unlike his predecessors 
he is not primarily interested in issues 
of stability or legitimacy or justice, but 
in civic virtue. The problem that arises 
in diverse societies is how to achieve a 
consensus on important political issues 
among citizens who hold very differ-
ent and sometimes even conflicting mo-
ral values. The character of civic virtue 
is one such important issue. One possi-
ble answer to the diversity dilemma, as 
Thomas Hobbes realized, is to put aside 
all those differences that bring us into 
conflict with each other and concentrate 








Summary  The author discusses the political implications of the sovereignty of evil, 
which is the core concept introduced by Derek Edyvane is his forthcoming book Civic Vir-
tue and the Sovereignty of Evil. The author’s main argument is that citizens would have a 
hard time achieving a consensus on the preventive politics worth pursuing without first 
reaching an agreement regarding the evil they are trying to prevent. The problem is that 
the concept of sovereign evil is plural in its nature and, therefore, leads to new conflicts, 
rather than to a consensus among citizens. The article tries to identify instances in which a 
competing understanding of this concept might arise, and concludes by arguing that the 
model of preventive politics requires more that mere recognition of sovereign evil to be-
come politically viable.*
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avoid from happening. This is the core 
of preventive politics, either in the con-
text of religious diversity in mid-17th 
century England that Hobbes was fac-
ing or of multicultural diversity we are 
facing today – citizens can find a com-
mon political language through identi-
fying the social evils they want to avoid 
at any cost.
This type of politics is much less am-
bitious than aspirational politics, which 
strives not only to stop civil wars, acts 
of genocide, wide-spread poverty, mas-
sive unemployment or worse, but also 
to offer a more positive political vision. 
The problem with aspirational political 
projects is that they are based on an as-
sumption that we can reach an agree-
ment on common good that we as a po-
litical community want to pursue or on 
basic principles of justice we all want 
to embrace. Edyvane joins the theorists 
who are skeptical about such aspiration-
al political projects (Geuss, 2008; Gray, 
1997, 2000; Hampshire, 1989, 2001; Judt, 
2010), and chooses the two most influ-
ential models in recent political theory 
– Sandel’s “politics of common good” 
and Rawls’s “politics of right” – to illus-
trate in what way aspirational politics 
stumbles when faced with the diversity 
dilemma. We can use Rawls’s concept 
of “burdens of judgment” to show how 
Sandel’s approach failed to resolve the 
problem of conflicting conceptions of 
good. As long as we assume that citizens 
can hold reasonable, but mutually exclu-
sive conceptions of good, we are faced 
with the problem of formulating what 
the politics of common good should ac-
tually entail. In the same vein that San-
del presumes the existence of politi-
cal consensus on the ideal of common 
good, Rawls, more modestly, presumes 
the existence of a consensus on the prin-
ciples of justice. However, the similar 
problem arises, Edyvane argues, when 
we need to formulate these basic prin-
ciples of justice. Even if unbiased, un-
prejudiced, well-informed and reasona-
ble, citizens still might disagree on what 
principles of justice their community 
should embrace. This is the reason why 
Edyvane turns to the preventive charac-
ter of public morality and hopes to find 
a basis in “the prevention of great evils” 
(Edyvane, 2012: IV, 1) for establishing a 
consensus on civic virtues. The assump-
tion here is that although all reasonable 
people might not be able to agree on the 
common good or the principles of jus-
tice, they will be able to agree when it 
comes to identifying such great evils and 
their prevention.
The philosophical narrative under-
lining Edyvane’s core argument is a vari-
ant of ethical naturalism (using as its 
starting point shared historical experi-
ence rather than the facts about human 
biology). He follows Stuart Hampshire 
in his claim that there are universal evils 
that affect human beings qua human be-
ings, not as members of a specific culture 
or moral tradition. As Hampshire points 
out: “there is nothing mysterious or ‘sub-
jective’ or culture bound in the great 
evils of human experience” (Hampshire, 
1989: 90). Edyvane embraces this line of 
argument when he, for example, talks 
about starvation as being “identifiable as 
evil independently of any particular set 
of moral beliefs” (Edyvane, 2012: IV, 9). 
These are, we could say, pre-metaphy-
sical evils because they do not rely on 
any specific metaphysical framework to 
be recognized as evils. One could argue 
that there are no such pre-metaphysical 
evils and that recognizing something as 
evil always presupposes certain meta-























of argument I want to explore in this pa-
per. My aim is to show that, even if we 
accept Hampshire’s and Edyvane’s idea 
that there are universal evils all reason-
able people want to avoid, this idea can 
not, at least in the realm of politics, do 
the job Edyvane wants it to do. The main 
reason for this is that the concept of evil, 
just like the concepts of good and jus-
tice, is open to plural interpretation and, 
therefore, fails to resolve the diversity 
dilemma. Preventive politics faces the 
same challenge both politics of common 
good and politics of right face.
Edyvane on the Plural Character 
of Evil
Edyvane talks about different under-
standings of the concept of evil in two 
instances. In chapter four of the manu-
script, he distinguishes between the con-
cepts of evil and harm. Evil is understood 
as something brought about by human 
agency (such as genocide), while harm is 
defined as a type of evil that is not neces-
sarily brought about by actions of other 
persons (such as starvation). Often it is 
very hard, Edyvane points out, to make 
a clear distinction between evils that 
came about through human interference 
and those that do not involve any such 
interference. For example, although we 
can universally recognize poverty as an 
evil, poverty itself can be caused by hu-
man action, by natural causes or by the 
combination of both. Determining the 
right causes of a specific evil in a specific 
context often results in irresolvable ar-
guments and, therefore, lowers the pos-
sibility of reaching a consensus on the 
true nature of evil addressed. This is why 
Edyvane introduces the concept of basic 
evil where the level of harm is the cru-
cial element and not its true cause. The 
concept of basic evil is contrasted with 
the concept of moral evil which neces-
sarily presupposes that specific evil was 
brought about by the actions of ration-
al agents. The politics of prevention of 
great evils should leave the task of iden-
tifying the perpetrators or causes of such 
evils aside and concentrate on alleviat-
ing terrible suffering independently of 
its source. 
The second instance where Edyvane 
talks about different types of evil is when 
he introduces the distinction between 
contingent basic evil and sovereign basic 
evil. In the case of contingent basic evil, 
something is recognized as a basic evil 
from the perspective of a specific mo-
ral tradition, but is not necessarily iden-
tified as evil by members of other mo-
ral traditions. Edyvane gives the exam-
ple of the egalitarian claim that a soci-
ety in which the interests of the worst 
off are not taken into account should be 
identified as a deeply unjust society be-
cause it fails to address what they see as 
a basic evil. However, since conserva-
tives or libertarians will see things in a 
very different light, in this case we can 
only talk of a contingent basic evil. On 
the other hand, sovereign basic evil is a 
term for those evils that are universally 
understood as such. Edyvane here men-
tions starvation as one such evil: “condi-
tions of starvation are a sovereign evil” 
because they are “identifiable as evil in-
dependently of any particular set of mo-
ral beliefs” (Edyvane, 2012: IV, 9). Again, 
the politics of prevention should occupy 
itself with fostering only those civic vir-
tues that are important barriers to sove-
reign basic evils, rather than to different 
contingent basic evils.
Although both distinctions – basic 
vs. moral evil and contingent vs. sove-
reign evil – make sense, I want to go a 
























much harder than Edyvane suggests to 
find a common ground just on the ba-
sis of recognizing that there is such a 
thing as sovereign basic evil. The prob-
lem of recognizing something as a ba-
sic evil requires of us to identify the true 
cause of such an evil, otherwise our re-
sponse will most probably be misguided 
or inadequate. For Edyvane the cause it-
self is irrelevant, what matters is that we 
recognize something as universal evil 
and formulate proper preventive tactics 
or a response to such an evil. Howev-
er, I think that it would be very hard to 
achieve a consensus among citizens with 
diverse moral outlooks on an appropri-
ate response if there is no agreement on 
what caused (or can cause) such an evil 
in the first place. Take Edyvane’s exam-
ple of fostering the civic virtue of aus-
terity as a proper response to avoiding a 
global economic crisis. We can all reco-
gnize that such a crisis is something we 
all want to avoid. However, that does not 
mean we will all perceive the virtue of 
austerity as a proper response to such a 
crisis or that we will all define austerity 
in the same way. It seems that the char-
acter of the response will largely depend 
on the way one explains the causes of 
such an economic crisis. For those who 
see the main reason for the latest crisis 
in insufficient state regulation of greedy 
bankers gambling with other people’s 
money, austerity might seem as a right 
response. The call for austerity will en-
courage all citizens to try and live more 
modestly, to expect and spend much 
less. This would be especially true for 
those who buy real estate beyond their 
means or those in the financial sector 
who expect enormous bonuses. On the 
other hand, for people who blame state 
intervention for upsetting the markets 
and not only causing, but prolonging the 
crisis, austerity will have a very different 
meaning. In this case, the call for auster-
ity will be directed towards the state and 
its numerous regulatory agencies, while 
citizens will be asked to continue spend-
ing so that markets can revive themselves 
as soon as possible. There is also a third 
narrative of how the crisis came about: 
the main problem is not to be found in 
specific political or economic players – 
the banks, the state, or fiscally irrespon-
sible citizens – but in the capitalist sys-
tem itself. If we perceive the current 
economic system as not only deeply un-
just, but also unsustainable in the long 
run, invoking austerity as a civic virtue 
would only prolong the agony of status 
quo. What we need are not minor re-
forms, but a radical change of the system 
itself, and a call for austerity is the wrong 
way to go about achieving this.
One could argue that only one of 
these diagnoses can be correct and that 
we can therefore disregard the other two 
completely. To do that, however, we must 
not only analyze, but also agree upon the 
true causes of the evil – in this case, the 
global economic crisis – we are trying to 
prevent. This is exactly what Edyvane 
tries to avoid when he introduces the 
concept of basic evil. If our goal is only to 
recognize something as basic evil, than 
there is no need to talk about the causes. 
Politics of prevention, I would argue, re-
quires more: we need to be able to for-
mulate and reach a consensus on the 
proper way of avoiding such evil in the 
future. The example I have given sug-
gests that this can only be done if we in-
clude into the equation the causes of evil 
we are trying to prevent. 
The second problem with Edyvane’s 
concept of sovereign basic evil is that he 
assumes that, once the distinction be-
tween contingent and sovereign evil is 























to the latter. The logic behind this as-
sumption is that we can expect a uni-
versal consensus on the prevention of 
sovereign evil because all citizens, inde-
pendently of the moral tradition they 
adhere to, will perceive it as something 
they want to prevent. The question is: if 
a certain sovereign evil comes into con-
flict with a certain contingent evil, will all 
the citizens always give priority to pre-
venting the sovereign evil? We can, for 
example, all agree on civic unrest being 
a sovereign evil, but that does not neces-
sarily mean that those who hold a spe-
cific understanding of justice – let us 
say, the egalitarian concept of social jus-
tice – will want to prevent civic unrest 
at the cost of sacrificing their contingent 
goal of eradicating deep social injustices. 
Again, from the perspective of preven-
tive politics it is not enough to achieve a 
consensus on what sovereign basic evils 
are; it is also necessary to reach an agree-
ment among all citizens that preventing 
those evils should always come before 
preventing any contingent basic evils.
The Plurality of Evil Revisited
Preventive politics is put into ques-
tion if citizens disagree on the true cau-
ses of a catastrophe and therefore dis-
agree on how to avoid it. The same can 
be said if they do not agree that prevent-
ing sovereign evils should always have 
priority over preventing contingent evils. 
However, these are not the only instan-
ces where the plural character of the 
concept of evil comes to the fore. In what 
follows, I want to address these other in-
stances and explore the challenge they 
present for Edyvane’s project. 
The primacy of evil problem: The possi-
bility that citizens might decide to give 
priority to preventing contingent rath-
er than sovereign evil if they, from their 
moral perceptive, perceive the former as 
more important has already been dis-
cussed. There is, however, a possibility 
that we are faced with two sovereign basic 
evils and are unable to reach a consensus 
on which of the two evils should be giv-
en priority. Bjørn Lomborg, in his con-
troversial study, The Skeptical Environ-
mentalist, argues that our current use of 
resources to prevent ecological catastro-
phe should be directed towards prevent-
ing and alleviating the harm that comes 
from poverty and diseases in developing 
countries (Lomborg, 2001). Following 
Edyvane’s lead, we can identify ecologi-
cal catastrophe, as well as poverty and 
disease as sovereign evils. The question 
is which of these should be given pri-
ority? It would be naïve to assume that 
all citizens will hold the same priorities 
when it comes to deciding between the 
prevention of conflicting sovereign evils. 
Lomborg argues for a change of global 
policy. He advocates a different alloca-
tion of resources based on cost-benefit 
analysis, while Edyvane is discussing the 
issue of civic virtues which is not a ze-
ro-sum game in a way many policy deci-
sions are. Would it not be possible to de-
velop public ethics in a way that would 
avoid forcing citizens to make either/or 
choices? It probably would, but there 
would still be cases in which choosing 
which set of virtues to develop would 
entail sacrificing the development of 
some other set of virtues. 
The abstract vs. the substantive problem: 
Citizens holding diverse moral values 
might be able to agree which sovereign 
evils the community should address in 
very general terms, but when it comes to 
clearly formulating the nature of these 
evils, the values of particular moral tra-
























quired by preventive politics uncertain. 
Edyvane addresses this issue in chapter 
5 of his book by introducing the distinc-
tion between particular substantive vir-
tue and abstract procedural virtue. He ac-
knowledges that it might not be possible 
to reach a consensus on what particular 
substantive virtue we should cultivate, 
but we can still reach an agreement on 
abstract procedural virtue based on the 
universal recognition of sovereign ba-
sic evil. We could agree on, e.g., “the ab-
stract prohibition on the collapse of civi-
lized life” (Edyvane, 2012: V, 14) even if 
we can not agree on how exactly to ad-
dress this prohibition. This argument 
is not convincing. Take the example of 
the protection of basic human rights 
as a universal goal the whole commu-
nity can endorse. The violation of such 
rights would be perceived as a sovereign 
evil and the fostering of respect for hu-
man rights as an abstract procedural vir-
tue. However, when it comes to defining 
what the violation of basic rights entails, 
different moral traditions will offer dif-
ferent accounts, dissolving the consen-
sus on sovereign evil into a disagreement 
on competing contingent evils. One ex-
ample that illustrates this is a document 
published by the Vatican’s Pontifical 
Council for the Family in 2000. In The 
Family and Human Rights, apart from 
the abortion, threats to the “sovereign-
ty of the family” (which include same-
-sex marriages, high divorce rates and 
pre-marital sexual experiences) are rec-
ognized as perilous for the protection of 
human rights (Pontifical Council for the 
Family, 2000). It is clear that advocates 
of more liberal values would not only 
refuse to accept such a definition of vio-
lation of human rights, but would insist 
that the freedom to enter same-sex mar-
riage, to divorce and to have pre-marital 
sexual experiences is what human rights 
should actually ensure. The fact that 
both Catholics and liberals agree on the 
abstract procedural virtue of promoting 
respect for human rights, in the context 
of preventive public ethics, is of small 
importance if they have a deep disagree-
ment on particular substantive virtues 
through which such respect is achieved.
The problem of moral community: Even 
when we assume that there is an agree-
ment on both the true nature of a sove-
reign evil and on how to prevent this 
evil, we still have to decide who it is that 
we want to protect. Do we opt for a cos-
mopolitan option where the whole of 
the humanity is perceived as our moral 
community? Or do we stop at the bor-
ders of our nation-state and limit our 
concerns only to citizens of our own 
political community? Preventive public 
ethics addresses grave harms whose im-
pact is often not limited to a single na-
tion-state and, therefore, it is important 
to determine whether we want to make 
every human being affected by such 
harms our moral concern or whether 
we want to draw a line somewhere and 
make a clear distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. Richard Rorty addresses this 
issue in his essay, “Who are We? Mo-
ral Universalism and Economic Triage”, 
and argues that, in cases where we are 
faced with a catastrophe, it would be 
both unrealistic and hypocritical to say 
that equal moral weight should be given 
to members of our own political com-
munity and to those who are outside of 
that community. The dark scenario that 
Rorty has in mind is one where there are 
not enough resources in the world to 
satisfy the needs of all the people in it. 
“[S]uppose that there is no imaginable 
way to make decent life-chances avail-























of the members of the United Nations 
while still keeping intact the democratic 
socio-political institutions cherished by 
the richer one billion”, he writes, “then 
they [the richer] will begin to treat the 
poor and unlucky five billion as surplus 
to their moral requirements, unable to 
play a part in their moral life” (Rorty, 
1996: 12). We can take this kind of stand 
of inevitability only if we accept that ci-
tizens of more developed countries will 
always rank interests of their own com-
munity above those of less developed 
countries, even when those less fortu-
nate are faced with such evils as extreme 
poverty. A more cosmopolitan and less 
nationalist thinker than Rorty might see 
things in a very different way. The prob-
lem of preventive politics is that it can 
not avoid answering the question of who 
it is exactly that we are trying to protect 
from the worst evils. Again, in diverse 
societies there will be no single answer 
to this question. An additional problem 
is if we include not just the geographical, 
but also the temporal component: how 
far are we ready to sacrifice the interests 
of future generations in preventing the 
great evils for our own generation? This 
seems to be an especially important is-
sue for the current discussions on eco-
nomic stability vs. long-term ecological 
sustainability. 
The problem of risk: A number of social 
evils (poverty, diseases, energy scarcity) 
can be prevented by the introduction of 
new technologies. However, such tech-
nologies as nuclear energy or genetically 
modified food are not just beneficial, but 
they carry a certain risk with them too. 
These risks are serious enough to threat-
en the basic interest of all humans and 
can, therefore, be classified as potential 
sovereign evils. The question that arises 
is: what risks are we ready to take when 
it comes to preventing grave evils? Are 
we ready to use technologies that could 
themselves, in the worst case scenario, 
result in even worse catastrophes? This 
is the question that Hans Jonas addres-
ses in his The Imperative of Responsibi-
lity, where he argues for a new ethics that 
would make us responsible for the fu-
ture of humanity by forbidding the solu-
tions that could result in the destruction 
of humanity itself (Jonas, 1985). We can 
side with Jonas or we can be much more 
risk-prone: the point is that it is not re-
alistic to expect that citizens will reach a 
universal consensus on the level of risk 
they are ready to accept when it comes 
to these kinds of questions. Again, this 
issue seems to fall into the realm of poli-
cy or high-rank decision-making, and 
not into the realm that those interested 
in civic virtue might be concerned with. 
Nevertheless, an investigation into civic 
virtues should deal with citizens’ aver-
sion to risk and their access to informa-
tion that enables them to take rational 
decisions on these issues.
The line not to be crossed: A disagreement 
among citizens can arise on the issue of 
how far each of them is prepared to go to 
avoid something that they all perceive as 
a sovereign basic evil. As mentioned ear-
lier, successful preventive politics needs 
to do more than just identify a certain 
universal evil; it also needs to formulate 
a response to such an evil. This response 
should be embraced by all reasonable 
citizens. It would be unrealistic to pre-
sume that everyone, independently of 
the moral values they hold, would be 
ready to do whatever is necessary to pre-
vent a certain evil from happening. Most 
citizens would have a certain line which 
they would not be willing to cross, even 
if that means being exposed to serious 
























ly differ in defining what that bottom is. 
Being exposed, for example, to the pos-
sibility of a deadly terrorist attack would 
fall under the heading of sovereign ba-
sic evil and, therefore, something that all 
reasonable citizens would want to pre-
vent. However, it would be reasonable 
to refuse to support or to be involved 
in torturing suspected terrorists, even if 
that proves to be an effective way of pre-
venting terrorist attacks. We just do not 
want to turn into monsters we are fight-
ing against. Equally, it would be reason-
able to argue that we need to do what-
ever it takes – including torture – to 
make sure such an attack does not hap-
pen. When discussing hope as one of the 
core civic virtues of the preventive ethics 
model, Edyvane invokes Cormac Mc-
Carthy’s novel The Road. Although the 
ultimate goal of the two main protago-
nists – the father and the son – is to sur-
vive in a post-apocalyptic world, they are 
not ready to do just anything to achieve 
this goal (such as becoming cannibals). 
More important than survival itself is 
that they, as the boy puts it, stay ‘good 
guys’ and that they ‘keep the fire’, i.e. not 
lose their humanity. In the end, when 
faced with a possible catastrophe, differ-
ent moral traditions will draw the line at 
very different points.
Conclusion
In listing instances in which the plu-
ral character of the concept of evil makes 
achieving consensus on the nature of 
preventive politics much harder among 
citizens, I was not trying to argue that 
the pursuit of preventive politics itself is 
a failed project. On the contrary, it is a 
worthwhile political goal, both in its the-
oretical and its more practical guise. Be-
cause it is a worthwhile goal that could 
enrich and enhance our understanding 
of what can be achieved through collec-
tive political action, it is worth explor-
ing all its benefits, but also its disadvan-
tages. Edyvane’s book gives us a detailed 
account of the benefits, but holds back 
somewhat when it comes to discuss-
ing the disadvantages. One such disad-
vantage explored in this paper is the as-
sumption that preventive politics offers 
a much better starting point than San-
del’s politics of common good or Rawls’s 
politics of right in defining what are the 
civic virtues that we should cultivate. 
This assumption rests on the argument 
that, although reasonable persons can 
give conflicting accounts of the good or 
of the right, they will all agree on uni-
versal evils, i.e. what Edyvane calls so-
vereign basic evil. Even if this assumption 
is correct, using the concept of evil as a 
mobilizing political force requires much 
more work than the mere acknowledg-
ment of the existence of universal evils. 
Even if we agree with Edyvane that 
“[t]he great, perennial evils are charac-
terised as those states of affairs that are 
directly felt as evils (by any normally re-
sponsive person)” (Edyvane, 2012: IV, 
15), we still need to introduce certain 
narratives that will determine in what 
way a political community will try to 
resolve the conflicts within the preven-
tive politics discussed in this paper. Such 
narratives are necessary even at the le-
vel of deciding which sovereign evils the 
community should focus on preventing. 
I can illustrate this by referring to an ex-
ample Edyvane himself uses, the issue of 
war being a sovereign evil. The fact that 
we can diagnose war as one of the so-
vereign evils is not something that is self-
-understandable or something that “any 
normally responsive person” would ne-
cessarily accept. Homeric heroes as well 
as followers of Nietzsche or Hegel might 























son that today war is perceived as one of 
those evils that should be prevented is a 
consequence of the narratives that were 
introduced after the horrors of WWII. 
There was nothing inevitable about this 
process: it was a result of conscious ef-
fort to replace the narrative of the war-
rior ethic with that of war as one of the 
ultimate evils. It is this kind of complex 
narratives that are needed to make pre-
ventive public ethics a successful politi-
cal project.
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Pluralnost zla
SAŽETAK Autor raspravlja o političkim implikacijama suverenosti zla, središnjeg koncepta 
koji Derek Edyvane uvodi u svojoj knjizi Civic Virtue and The Sovereignty of Evil. Autorov je 
glavni argument da građani teško mogu postići konsenzus oko preventivne politike koju 
žele slijediti a da ne postignu dogovor oko zla koje žele spriječiti. Problem je u tome što je 
koncept zla po svojoj prirodi pluralan i stoga vodi novim sukobima, a ne konsenzusu izme-
đu građana. Članak pokušava identificirati one instance u kojima suprotstavljena shvaća-
nja ovoga koncepta mogu isplivati, te zaključuje tvrdeći kako model preventivne politike 
zahtijeva više od same ideje suverenog zla da bi postao politički relevantan.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI Edyvane, pluralizam, preventivna politika, zlo
